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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this column is to look at how US copyright law deals with facts and what
can reasonably be considered as a fact.
Design/methodology/approach – The US statutes and case law are examined, as well as standard
practices within academic settings for the use and analysis of facts.
Findings – Using facts may require a risk assessment under certain circumstances. Although facts
cannot be protected under US law, compilations of facts can have protection under the European
Database Directive, and certain apparent facts, such as normal human body temperature, represent
judgments based on extensive research and analysis. It is not always clear when a research result
achieves the status of a fact and is therefore exempt from copyright protection.
Originality/value – The use of facts is an essential part of scholarly work and factual compilations
are important tools for many scholarly communities. Understanding how far facts may be used and
manipulated helps researchers and teachers who have grown anxious about copyright infringement.
Keywords Copyright law, United States of America
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Introduction
[My mother] always says, my Lord, that facts are like cows. If you look them in the face hard
enough they generally run away – Bunter to Lord Peter (Sayers, 1927).
One of the most common copyright questions I get in my role as copyright advisor is
whether a graphical representation of a statistical analysis of data may be copied and
used online. In other words, can the data and the resulting graph be considered facts? Or
do the data points on the graph represent an analysis with enough originality to meet the
requirement of the copyright law? And do the data underlying the analysis have the legal
status of “facts” or did the work that went into creating or assembling them suffice for
copyright protection? Facts are rarely simple when looked at carefully enough.
The goal of this column is to help answer these questions. Only a court can give a
definitive answer. I will present some of the factors that a US court might consider,
including:
. the US copyright statutes;
. the 1991 Feist decision that discussed both facts and compilations of facts; and
. the 1999 Bridgeman Art Library decision, where the court considered the effect
of a mechanical process on public domain materials.
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I will also talk briefly about how the European Database directive might affect the
handling of facts within the European Union.
Facts in the statutes
The subject matter of US copyright law lies in “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression” and:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work (17 USC 102).
Ideas are, in other words, excluded from copyright protection. Facts are too, but not
quite so explicitly. The exclusion of facts rests largely on the meaning of the word
“original.” Originality is a quality that facts are not supposed to have.
The US copyright law has a section with definitions (17 USC 101), but that section
contains no definition of the words “fact”. As far as the US copyright statute is
concerned, the word has no special legal meaning, unlike, for example, “publication” –
an equally ordinary word whose legal meaning is broader than its conventional usage.
Even in conventional usage the precise meaning of the word “fact” can be difficult to
pin down. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary has five definitions for the word,
the most specific of which is: “a piece of information presented as having objective
reality” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2006). Objective reality can, however, be
a subjective matter.
For example, 378C (98.6 Fahrenheit) is widely quoted as the normal temperature for
humans and is often treated as a fact when teaching school children. It is actually an
average that researchers determined in the nineteenth century from a composite of
readings. That average is seen today as possibly somewhat high and as more of a point
within a range of reasonable healthy human temperatures than as a single expression
of objective reality.
Nonetheless few people outside the medical profession would dispute 378C (98.6
Fahrenheit) as a fact. Does that mean it is one? Or is it not a fact because of the
intellectual originality and physical labor that went into establishing and, more recently,
reconsidering the average? This is the kind of uncertainty that faculty and students face
in knowing whether something is a “fact” for online publications or teaching.
Facts as defined in Feist
The 1991 Supreme Court ruling in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Inc. is a
landmark case that defines how US copyright law views facts and compilations of facts.
Rural Telephone was a utility that served parts of Kansas. Feist was a publishing
company that reused information from Rural Telephone’s white pages listings in its
own directory without the utility’s consent. Rural Telephone sued for infringement,
and the District Court upheld their infringement complaint. The Appeals Court did too,
but the Supreme Court reversed that decision:
. . . it was held that (1) the names, towns, and telephone numbers listed in the white pages
were not protected by the telephone company’s copyright in its combined white and yellow
pages directory, because the listings in the white pages were not original to the telephone
company, since (a) the listings, rather than owing their origin to the telephone company, were




arranged these uncopyrightable facts in an original way sufficient to satisfy the minimum
standards for copyright protection (US Supreme Court, 1991).
The Court explained that there were circumstances under which a factual complication
might have copyright protection as well as the limits of that protection:
Although a factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original selection or
arrangement of facts, and although a compilation author who clothes facts with an original
collocation of words may be able to claim a copyright in this written expression, others may
copy from the publication the underlying facts but not the precise words used to present
them, because (1) the copyright is limited to the particular selection or arrangement, and (2) in
no event may copyright extend to the facts themselves, since, no matter how original the
format of the selection or arrangement, the facts do not become original through association;
thus, notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts
contained in another’s publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the
competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement.
The Court’s reasoning rested on the constitutional basis underlying US Copyright law:
. . . the primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, where to this end, copyright, under the principle known as
the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, which applies to all works of authorship,
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely
upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.
The Court rejected the “sweat of the brow” doctrine because it distorts “basic copyright
principles”:
Although protection for facts and ideas that are the fruits of an author’s research may in
certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair competition, to accord copyright
protection on the basis of the doctrine known as “sweat of the brow” or “industrious
collection” – the underlying notion of which is that copyright is a reward for the hard work
that goes into compiling facts – distorts basic copyright principles, in that it creates a
monopoly in public domain materials without the necessary justification of protecting and
encouraging the creation of writings by authors, where (1) the most fundamental axiom of
basic copyright principles is that no one may copyright facts or ideas, and (2) it is just such
wasted effort that would result from relying on facts contained in prior works that the
proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts is designed to prevent.
The Court also interpreted the definition of “compilation” in the Copyright Act as
meaning that collections of facts are not copyrightable per se, and emphasized the
originality requirement for any legitimate copyright of a compilation:
The purpose of the definition of “compilation” in 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (17 USCS
101) – which defines a compilation in the copyright sense as a work formed by the collection
and assembly of pre-existing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged
in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship –
is to emphasize that collections of facts are not copyrightable per se; this message is conveyed
through 101’s structure identifying three distinct elements required to be met for a work to
qualify as a copyrightable compilation – (1) collection and assembly of pre-existing material,
(2) selection, coordination, or arrangement of the material, and (3) originality based on
selection, coordination, or arrangement; the plain language of 101 indicates that not every
collection of facts receives copyright protection, since otherwise there would be a period in




In this decision the Supreme Court does not define facts explicitly, but it does
emphasize one key characteristic: that facts are never original. At a common-sense
level this makes sense, much as did the dictionary definition about facts having
“objective reality.” But in the realm of scientific predictions, originality and reality can
suddenly switch places.
For example, in 1909 when Pickering and Lowell predicted the existence of Pluto,
the planet was essentially just the copyrightable expression of their original ideas. In
1930 after astronomers at the Lowell Observatory saw Pluto, the planet suddenly
transformed into a pre-existing unoriginal objective reality.
This happened even though the very act of seeing something in a telescope some
millions kilometers away is itself a creative act that requires human judgment and
technical skill – a level of originality that long sufficed for photographs to have
copyright protection even when the subject was (like facts) in the public domain.
Bridgeman and slavish transformation
The issue in the case of Bridgeman Art Library vs Corel was whether an exact
photographic reproduction of a two-dimensional public domain work of art was itself
in the public domain, or whether the new image had sufficient originality for copyright
protection. The court reviewed cases where prior courts had granted copyright
protection to photographs, but decided that an attempt at slavish copying lacked the
originality necessary for copyright protection:
In this case, plaintiff by its own admission has labored to create “slavish copies” of public
domain works of art. While it may be assumed that this required both skill and effort, there
was no spark of originality – indeed, the point of the exercise was to reproduce the
underlying works with absolute fidelity. Copyright is not available in these circumstances
(US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1991).
The court also considered British law, since the Bridgeman Art Library is a British
institution. The decision quoted a work by Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary
Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Design. Laddie is now a British judge:
Under the 1988 Act the author is the person who made the original contribution and it will be
evident that this person need not be he who pressed the trigger, who might be a mere
assistant. Originality presupposes the exercise of substantial independent skill, labour,
judgment and so forth (US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1991).
The court also disagreed with plaintiff claims based on the skill need to take a
photograph and the change in medium from oil painting to a transparent slide:
Plaintiff nevertheless argues that the photocopier analogy is inapt because taking a
photograph requires greater skill than making a photocopy and because these transparencies
involved a change in medium. But the argument is as unpersuasive under British as under
U.S. law (US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1991).
What makes Bridgeman relevant to a discussion about facts and data is the degree to
which the comments about slavish copying carry over to other mechanical processes.
Statistics is a branch of mathematics that clearly requires significant understanding
and originality to create new tests or get any meaning out of a test. But contemporary
spreadsheet software will run a wide variety of statistical tests on any data that is




the process of holding a camera in front of a painting, and, as the court said in the
Bridgeman decision, the person who “pressed the trigger” or clicked on the calculate
button has not necessarily made an original contribution. Whether the resulting
numbers or graphs have any meaning certainly requires as much originality as
interpreting a painting. The raw process of mechanical creation may not.
Database protection
Statistical analysis involves a compilation of data. If those data are plainly facts, the
Feist ruling protects their public domain status in the US. The same is not necessarily
true in Europe.
The European Database Directive of 1996 required member states to enact
legislation protecting “a collection of independent works, data or other materials
arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic
or other means” (European Union, 1996). Database protection is somewhat different
than copyright protection and is more limited in time.
A British court decision suggests that copying only part of a database could be an
infringement, depending on the importance of the material, not just the amount:
On February 9, 2001, the High Court settled a case dealing with William Hill’s use of
information listed in the databases of the British Horseracing Board (BHB). William Hill had
published information about horses, jockeys and race lists for upcoming races on its website
without BHB’s consent. In the High Court’s decision, Justice Laddie based the court’s ruling
on the 1997 Copyright and Rights in Database Regulation in a novel way. The database
legislation protects the rights of owners if a substantial portion of the database is copied. The
Court held that William Hill had infringed on BHB’s copyrighted material protected by the
Database legislation, based on the importance of the material and not on the specific amount
of the copied information (Askanazi et al., 2001).
This suggests that use of someone else’s compilation of data, even if that data is purely
factual, could be a problem even if the process for analyzing it were considered as
mechanical as the slavish copying in the Bridgeman decision.
Conclusion
In copyright decisions the details matter. Those who wonder whether they can post
someone else’s graph of a statistical analysis on the web need to consider the following
points:
. Data – how closely do the data resemble something that most people would
consider to be an unoriginal fact that represented some form of objective reality?
It seems likely that most people would consider an average body temperature a
fact, even if on closer examination it turned out to be the result of prior scientific
analysis. Most people might also consider a set of astronomical observations to
be facts, despite the skill needed to get and interpret them. More people might be
skeptical about a set of composite measures like the index of consumer
confidence. The more unoriginal the data is, the safer its status as fact.
. Analysis – how mechanical was the analysis? Could multiple software packages
produce the same result with a minimum of human intervention? It seems
possible that the courts would regard a purely mechanical analytical process as




had to go into the selection of data could be a factor in favor of its originality. For
example, an graph showing the percentage of the world’s production of cars that
each country has might involve less originality than a t-test showing a
confidence interval for a political poll. The former involved significant sweat of
the brow for someone to assemble, but is making no choices about what to
include or exclude. The latter involves careful choices about the nature of the
sample and the population as a whole.
. Venue – a US venue (either in the form of a US-based server or a US publisher)
would have less risk for the use of someone else’s compilation of factual data than a
venue within the European Union, where compilations of data have more protection.
Risk assessment has become a fact of life for many individuals and institutions making
judgments about whether to use materials when the rights may belong to others. Those
who want certainty need either to find the rights owner and get permission, or to create
their own data and analysis.
Taking that low-risk route may please royalty-collecting organizations, but it also
contributes to undermining that key principle in US law that the point of copyright is
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Facts are supposed to be free for
all to use and to manipulate. That right should not be neglected.
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